DMARC 10111 min read · Updated Jun 2026

Every DKIM attribute, explained: signature tags and DNS key tags

DKIM has two halves: the tags inside the signature header your mail server adds, and the tags inside the public-key record published in DNS. Both use the same compact syntax. Here is what each one means and why it matters.

Part 1: The DKIM-Signature header

Your sending server adds this header to every email. The receiver reads its tags to know which key to fetch and exactly what was signed.

DKIM-Signature:
v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=xmpl.example; s=cdk2026;
c=relaxed/relaxed; q=dns/txt; t=1718900000;
h=from:to:subject:date; bh=Hk9p…; b=dzXq…
d=most important

The signing domain. This is the identity DKIM verifies, and the value DMARC checks for alignment against the visible From. A signature can be valid yet still fail DMARC if d= doesn’t align with your From domain.

s=most important

The selector. Combined with d=, it tells the receiver exactly where to fetch the public key: s._domainkey.d. Selectors let one domain run many keys at once: one per sender, or old and new during rotation.

a=

The signing algorithm, for example rsa-sha256 or ed25519-sha256. rsa-sha1 is obsolete and rejected. Significance: must match the key type published in DNS.

b=

The actual signature: the encrypted hash of the headers and body. This is what the public key decrypts to verify nothing was altered in transit.

bh=

The body hash. Computed separately so the receiver can detect body tampering even before checking the full signature. A mismatch here is the classic symptom of a mail relay rewriting content.

h=

The signed header list: exactly which headers are covered (always includes from). Headers not listed can be changed without breaking the signature. Significance: From must be here, or DMARC won’t trust the result.

c=

The canonicalization for header/body, for example relaxed/relaxed. Relaxed tolerates whitespace and line-wrapping changes by intermediate servers, while simple tolerates almost none. Relaxed is strongly recommended for survivability.

t= / x=

Timestamp of when the signature was created, and optional expiry. x= limits how long a captured signature stays valid, a defence against replay attacks.

i=

Optional identity of the signing user/agent within d=. Mostly informational and rarely needed.

Part 2: The public-key DNS record

Published as a TXT record at selector._domainkey.yourdomain.com, this holds the public key the receiver uses to verify the signature.

cdk2026._domainkey.xmpl.example TXT
v=DKIM1; k=rsa; t=s; h=sha256; p=MIIBIjANBg…
v=

Key record version: always DKIM1. Optional but recommended. If present, it must be first.

p=most important

The public key itself (Base64). This is the heart of the record. An empty p= is the official way to revoke a key: receivers treat the selector as permanently disabled.

k=

The key type: rsa (default) or ed25519. Must match the a= algorithm in the signature.

t=

Flags. t=y = test mode (receivers should not act on failures, and it is easy to leave on by mistake). t=s = strict: the signing i= identity must exactly match the d= domain, blocking subdomain signing.

h=

Permitted hash algorithms for this key, for example sha256. Restricts which hashes a verifier will accept.

s=

Permitted service type. s=email or * (default, any). Rarely changed.

Key length isn’t a tag, but it’s critical

The strength of p= depends on key length. Use 2048-bit RSA at minimum. 1024-bit is weak and 512-bit is broken. See key age, volume and rotation for why this matters and what compliance standards require.