DMARC 10110 min read · Updated Jun 2026

Forwarding, mailing lists and ARC signatures

When an email passes through a mailing list or forwarder, the original DKIM signature often breaks, and a second, intermediary signature appears alongside it. This is where ARC comes in. Here is what actually lands in the headers.

Why forwarding breaks DKIM

A DKIM signature includes a body hash (bh=) and covers a set of headers. A mailing list that appends a footer, rewrites the subject ([list] …), or otherwise edits the message changes the bytes the signature was computed over. The original signature can no longer validate. Meanwhile SPF also fails, because the message now arrives from the list’s IP, not the original sender’s. With neither aligned, plain DMARC fails, even though the mail is entirely legitimate.

What ARC is for

The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC), defined in RFC 8617, lets each intermediary record the authentication results it saw before it modified the message, and cryptographically sign that snapshot. The final receiver can then see that the message passed authentication at the origin, even though direct DKIM and SPF now fail. It may choose to honour that chain. ARC is supported by Gmail, Microsoft 365, Yahoo and other major providers, though it remains an Experimental standard and is honoured only from sealers a receiver trusts.

The three ARC headers

ARC-Authentication-Results(AAR)

A snapshot of the SPF / DKIM / DMARC results the intermediary observed when the message arrived.

ARC-Message-Signature(AMS)

A DKIM-like signature over the message as the intermediary forwards it, including any existing DKIM-Signature headers.

ARC-Seal(AS)

A signature over all the ARC headers, carrying a cv= chain-validation tag: none at the first hop, then pass or fail.

All three share an instance tag i= that starts at 1 and increments at each ARC-enabled hop, so multiple forwarders build a cumulative, ordered chain.

What it looks like in the headers

Alice sends from example.com through lists.org, which adds a footer and re-sends. At the final receiver the original DKIM is broken, but the list’s ARC set records that everything passed at hop 1:

# Added by the mailing list (instance i=1)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=lists.org; s=arc;
        cv=none; b=Ht4k2…
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=lists.org;
        s=arc; h=from:to:subject:date; bh=Pq9…; b=Rd7…
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; lists.org;
        dkim=pass header.d=example.com;
        spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=example.com;
        dmarc=pass header.from=example.com

# Original signature — now invalid (list changed the body)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.com; s=mar2024; …
From: alice@example.com

# At the final receiver:
Authentication-Results: mx.receiver.com;
        dkim=fail header.d=example.com (body modified);
        spf=fail; dmarc=fail header.from=example.com;
        arc=pass (i=1 spf=pass dkim=pass dmarc=pass as.1.lists.org=pass)

Direct DKIM, SPF and DMARC all fail. But arc=pass shows the message was authenticated before the list touched it. A receiver that trusts lists.org as a sealer can override the DMARC failure and deliver.

Important limits
  • ARC doesn’t create trust. A chain showing i=1 dmarc=fail just proves the mail was already failing before forwarding.
  • It’s honoured only from sealers the receiver trusts. Google and Microsoft let you configure trusted sealers.
  • There is no ARC DNS record to publish as a domain owner. Intermediaries generate ARC, not you. Understanding it just helps you diagnose forwarded-mail failures in your reports.

ARC is not a DKIM signature

ARC reuses DKIM’s signature format, which is why it appears alongside DKIM signatures and is easy to confuse with one. But they answer different questions. A DKIM signature says "this domain takes responsibility for this message." ARC says "here is the authentication state I observed, and a sealed record of the hops before me." When you see ARC headers in a sample, read them as a chain of custody, not as another aligned signature for DMARC.

References
  • RFC 8617: The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) Protocol (AAR / AMS / AS headers, i= and cv= tags). rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8617
  • RFC 7489: DMARC, on forwarding and intermediary failures.
  • RFC 6376: DKIM Signatures, §3.7 (body hash and header canonicalization).