Dual-signing with RSA and Ed25519
The clearest reason a single email carries two DKIM signatures: the sender is migrating from RSA to Ed25519 and signs with both at once. Here is exactly what that looks like in the headers, and why it is safe.
Why two algorithms exist
The original DKIM specification (RFC 6376) defined a single signing algorithm: RSA. In September 2018, RFC 8463 added a second: Ed25519-SHA256, an elliptic-curve algorithm with much shorter keys than RSA at a similar or higher security level. Its public key is only 32 bytes, so the base64-encoded form is 44 octets and fits comfortably in a single DNS TXT string.
The catch: RFC 8463 says verifiers MUST implement Ed25519, but in practice support is still uneven across receivers, gateways and tooling. If you switched to Ed25519 only, any verifier that didn’t understand it would treat your mail as unsigned. The solution the RFC builds in is to sign with both.
What the standard actually says
"For backward compatibility, signers can add multiple signatures that use old and new signing algorithms. Since there can only be a single key record in the DNS for each selector, the signatures have to use different selectors, although they can use the same
d=andi=identifiers."— RFC 8463 §6, Transition Considerations
Three rules fall out of this, all of which you can verify in the headers below:
- Same signing domain (
d=) on both signatures, so both align with your From domain for DMARC. - Different selectors (
s=), because each DNS selector record holds exactly one key. - Different algorithms (
a=): onersa-sha256, oneed25519-sha256.
What it looks like in the headers
A dual-signed message carries two DKIM-Signature headers. Note the shared d=xmpl.example, the different selectors (s=ed1 vs s=rsa1) and the different algorithms:
From: news@xmpl.example DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=xmpl.example; s=ed1; t=1719662400; h=from:to:subject:date; bh=2jUSOH9NhtVG…; b=h3Kp9c… DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=xmpl.example; s=rsa1; t=1719662400; h=from:to:subject:date; bh=2jUSOH9NhtVG…; b=Qk7vR2… Authentication-Results: mx.example.net; dkim=pass header.d=xmpl.example header.s=ed1 header.a=ed25519-sha256; dkim=pass header.d=xmpl.example header.s=rsa1 header.a=rsa-sha256; dmarc=pass header.from=xmpl.example (p=reject)
And the two DNS records
Each selector publishes its own public key. The Ed25519 record is marked with k=ed25519. The RSA record uses the default k=rsa.
ed1._domainkey.xmpl.example TXT "v=DKIM1; k=ed25519; p=11qYAYK…" rsa1._domainkey.xmpl.example TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIIBIjANBgkqh…"
How a verifier handles both
The two signatures are independent: either one would be valid on its own if the other were absent. A modern verifier that supports Ed25519 will prefer the ed25519-sha256 signature and need not even check the RSA one. A legacy verifier that doesn’t recognise Ed25519 simply ignores that header and falls back to rsa-sha256. Either way the message authenticates and DMARC passes. That is the entire point of dual-signing.
For most production senders in 2026, RSA-SHA256 with a 2048-bit key remains the safe universal default. Treat Ed25519 as a deliberate, dual-signed rollout, not a blind switch, so you never lose authentication on receivers that haven’t caught up.
- RFC 8463: A New Cryptographic Signature Method for DKIM (Ed25519-SHA256), §6 Transition Considerations and Appendix A. rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8463
- RFC 6376: DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures, §3.3, §3.5.
- RFC 8301: Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Usage Update to DKIM (RSA key-length guidance).